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COMMENTARY
COMMENT ON UNIVERSAL BANKING
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Geoffrey P. Miller*
Professor Helen Garten's thoughtful analysis of universal
banking and financial stability observes that it is far from easy,
and probably mistaken, to draw the conclusion that the Euro-
pean and Japanese experiences with expanded banking powers
will instantly replicate in the United States if banks in this
country are given enhanced powers along the model of Germany
or Japan. At the same time, Professor Garten is not so skeptical
about comparative analysis as to conclude that no meaningful
lessons can be drawn from the foreign experience. She does not
hesitate to draw appropriate inferences from the evidence, al-
though always with caution about the problems of comparison.
Professor Garten's paper can be recommended, therefore, as an
epitome of careful comparative work. Although she is not a pro-
fessional comparativist, her work can stand up with the best in
comparative work on methodological grounds alone.
What conclusions does Professor Garten draw from the evi-
dence she assesses? Her analysis is quite wide-ranging but the
two essential points are these: (1) The failure rates in countries
with expansive banking powers are lower than the failure rates
in the United States; and, (2) The reasons for the lower failure
rates, however, may have little to do with the greater asset and
activities powers of banks located in these jurisdictions.
As to the first point, Professor Garten is surely correct that
failure rates are lower in our peer group countries that allow
banks greater powers, at least considering the experience of the
past decade. Whether this observation holds true over a longer
period is perhaps somewhat more problematic. It is not immedi-
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ately clear how one can develop a metric to measure banking
stability. The United States banking system looks exceedingly
unstable if we examine the past decade (1983-93). However, if
we look at the half-century between 1933 and 1983, the picture
is not nearly as clearcut; for most of this period the American
banking system appears just as stable, or more stable, than its
Japanese and European peers, especially when the disruptions of
World War II are included. Just as the United States' stability
of 1933-83 did not predict the disruptions of the past decade in
this country, the past is not necessarily a prologue for other
banking'systems. We might look back at the Japanese banking
system in a few years and wonder how we ever imagined it to be
such a paragon of stability, given the high level of troubled loans
and stock market losses that have plagued Japanese banks over
the past few years. Nevertheless, Professor Garten's general
characterization of the United States system as less stable than
its peer group systems is probably accurate enough for present
purposes.
Turning to the explanations of the relative instability of the
United States system, Professor Garten builds both a positive
and a negative case for her argument that stability is not neces-
sarily the consequence of expanded bank powers. Professor Gar-
ten challenges the idea that the diversification permitted by uni-
versal banking will necessarily benefit banks or increase the
stability of the system. Activities are not like financial assets in
a portfolio: diversification is harder to achieve in the case of ac-
tivities and may be accompanied by a loss of valuable monitor-
ing that dissipates whatever value the diversification may offer.
Positively, Professor Garten argues that the apparently greater
stability of universal banking systems, and of other systems in
which banks exercise greater asset powers than in the United
States, is principally explained by factors other than enhanced
powers.
Professor Garten sees the existence of a stable customer
base as an important element in European and Japanese sys-
tems. She suggests that the existence of close bank-customer re-
lationships creates risk-aversion by all parties and provides ma-
jor borrowers, which are likely also to be connected to their
banks by ties of ownership, with an incentive to rescue failing
banks. Professor Garten offers little evidence of borrower res-
cues, but she is clearly correct that borrowers tend to be more
closely linked to their lending banks in Europe and Japan than
(Vol. XlX'l
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to banks in the United States.
Moreover, Professor Garten is also persuasive when she ar-
gues that the stable customer base in these foreign systems is
largely due to the underdevelopment of alternatives to bank fi-
nancing, such as commercial paper or other directly issued se-
curities. With the development of such markets - a phenome-
non that happened earlier in the United States than in Japan
and that is still in the early stages in Germany - the system of
stable bank-customer relations tends to break down.' But this is
a function of securities market conditions, not of universal
banking.
Professor Garten also stresses the importance of industry
structure, observing that the highly decentralized United States
system of more than 12,000 commercial banks and several thou-
sand thrift institutions may be less stable than the much more
centralized banking markets in Europe and Japan. Professor
Garten is on the money in linking stability with industry struc-
ture. There is plenty of evidence that the instability of the
American banking system is related to the balkanized nature of
the American banking industry.2 The structure of the American
banking industry, however, is not a direct function of bank
powers.
Finally, Professor Garten emphasizes the importance of reg-
ulatory policy, observing that United States bank regulators
have traditionally been less aggressive at preventing failures
than their European and Japanese counterparts. Again, Profes-
sor Garten is probably correct that United States regulators
have tended to intervene later in the day than regulators in
other industrialized nations - a fact which may be explained by
this nation's balkanized banking structure, in which only a few
1. As Litt, Macey, Rubin and I demonstrate in another work, when the Ministry of
Finance allowed the introduction of commercial paper market in Japan, the so-called
"stable" bank customer base quickly evaporated as borrowers sought out the best deals
and played one bank off against the other. See David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucra-
cies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the
United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369 (1990).
2. A seminal scholar in this field is Charles W. Calomiris, whose historical research
indicates that banks in American states which prohibited branching were significantly
less stable, on average, than banks which allowed branching. See Charles W. Calomiris,
Regulation, Industrial Structure, and Stability in U.S. Banking: An Historical Perspec-
tive, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING 19 (M. Klausner & L. White eds., 1993). For a
survey of some of the literature on the relationship between stability and industry struc-
ture, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic
Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1083 (1992).
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institutions were considered "too big to fail." Again, however,
these differences in regulatory philosophy are not a function of
bank powers.
Professor Garten's paper provides an important corrective
to those who might conclude, from inadequate evidence, that the
key to European-style stability is to permit United States banks
to engage in European-style activities. Her paper thus could be
taken as counseling against the introduction of universal bank-
ing into United States banking markets. However, Professor
Garten's paper does not, in fact, address the general case for or
against universal banking.
Professor Garten therefore raises, but does not answer, the
fundamental question: Should the United States regulatory sys-
tem move in the direction of universal banking by allowing
American banks greater asset and activities powers?
In my view, the evidence cited by Professor Garten does not
impeach the case for wide-ranging liberalization of United
States bank powers. Remember that a rule allowing universal
banking would not ipso facto change anything about United
States banking structure. That would only happen if United
States banks themselves decided to place their capital and assets
in a venture other than banking. Facilitating universal banking
would merely introduce a market test: Banks would enter new
product lines only if they saw these activities as sufficiently at-
tractive to justify the risks involved and would stay in these new
lines only if the activities proved to be profitable in the long run.
Our limited experience with bank securities powers suggests
that the vast majority of United States banks would not make
use of these expanded powers at all. Only a very few banks are
large or sophisticated enough in the securities business to enter
these markets for the long haul. The risks of an experiment with
universal banking are, accordingly, not as great as might be
imagined.
It is true that universal banking will not be a panacea for
problems of instability or low profitability in the industry today.
But this only suggests that we should do more to address these
problems directly, not that we should place roadblocks in the
path of expanded bank powers.
Whether or not we allow universal banking, by all means,
let us work toward reasonable policies calculated to increase the
competitiveness and health of the United States banking sys-
tem. While this is not the place to articulate a program for
200 [Vol. XIXJl
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meaningful banking reform, at least three useful measures can
be recommended.
First, Professor Garten mentions that bank stockholders do
not actively monitor their banks. In the days before deposit in-
surance, however, banks in the United States operated under a
system of double liability: If a bank failed, the bank's sharehold-
ers would be assessed an amount up to the par value of their
stock for the benefit of the bank's creditors, including deposi-
tors.3 This system gave bank shareholders good reason to moni-
tor their banks and to become risk-averse at exactly the point
where the bank got into trouble. Double-liability enlisted bank
shareholders as effective risk-monitors while, at the same time,
it avoided the problem of excessive risk-aversion that might be
introduced by relying on debt-holders as monitors. Although it
is too late in the day to return to the old system of double-liabil-
ity, it would be useful for banking regulators to consider award-
ing special credit under the capital adequacy guidelines for
banks that issue some type of assessable stock to sophisticated
investors.
Second, our system of deposit insurance is surely a prime
culprit in the instability of the American banking system over
the past few years. As is by now well understood, deposit insur-
ance tends to reward risk-takers and to penalize sound bank
management. Although some useful reforms of deposit insurance
have been implemented - risk-based insurance premia and
early closure requirements being the prime examples - these
reforms are themselves potentially costly. Much more funda-
mental reform is indicated if we are to enable the American
banking system to recover from the catastrophes of past years
and emerge as a stable and powerful competitor on the world
stage. Ironically, the banking system was arguably safer without
deposit insurance; although many banks failed during the era
before deposit insurance, the losses to depositors from bank fail-
ure were very, very small.4 We should drastically cut back on the
federal deposit insurance guarantee and subject banks and their
managers to the discipline of the marketplace, while at the same
time offering a safe transaction vehicle and a small-savers ac-
3. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Share-
holders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. RE V. 31 (1992).
4. See Macey & Miller, supra note 3, at 59 (average annual losses to depositors from
failures of national banks equalled only 44 cents per one thousand dollars of deposit
between 1865 and 1934).
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count for individuals. 5
Third, it is time to jettison the preposterously outmoded
system of geographic restrictions that have fractured the United
States banking industry into so many thousands of firms. Let us
now permit unlimited, nationwide branching. Congress came
close to doing so last year but the legislation was derailed at the
last minute. Other than deposit insurance reform, nationwide
branch banking would arguably be the single most valuable mea-
sure for increasing the stability as well as the efficiency of the
United States banking system.'
Professor Garten does not necessarily disagree with all these
recommendations, some of which seem indicated by the evidence
she herself cites. If these or similar reforms could be imple-
mented, then universal banking would probably not be de-stabi-
lizing for the United States banking industry. While its effects
would probably be fairly minor, at least in the short run, univer-
sal banking might well offer benefits to bankers, consumers of
banking services, and the American economic system.
5. In fact, some of the better managed banks have good reason to question the value
of deposit insurance, given the roughly seven-fold increase in deposit insurance premi-
ums over the past few years. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Non-deposit
Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 237, 239-43 (1992). If
given the opportunity to opt out of federal deposit insurance, some banks would seri-
ously consider doing so. Indeed, if permitted by state law, banks can already opt out of
federal deposit insurance, and if they do, they can also avoid a host of other burdensome
federal regulations. As Jonathan Macey and I demonstrate in a recent article, by opting
out of federal deposit insurance and making certain other changes in its operations, such
a bank could become a bona fide universal bank with the full range of securities powers
available to non-bank firms. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward En-
hanced Consumer Choice in Banking: Uninsured Deposit Facilities as Financial In-
termediaries for the 1990s, 1991 ANN. Sunv. AM. L. 865 (1992). Such a bank, moreover,
could be owned by any firm, even one engaged in ordinary commercial enterprises.
6. For debate on the desirability of nationwide branch banking, compare Geoffrey
P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77 IowA L.
REV. 1083 (1992) with Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few to Serve? The
Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REv. 957 (1992) and Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Potential Risks of Nationwide Consolidation in the Banking Industry:
A Reply to Professor Miller, 77 IowA L. REv. 1133 (1992).
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